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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
UTAH LIQUOR CONTROL
COMMISSION,
Libelant and Appellant and
Cross-Respondent,
-vs.CLUB FERACO, et al.,
Libelees and Respondents
and Cross-Appelalnts.

Case No. 8649

BRIEF OF APPELLANT UPON APPEAL
AND REPLY BRIEF ON CROSS-APPEAL

STATEMENT OF FACTS
In the early morning hours of November 2, 1956,
Philip Ralph Caldwell, a police officer of Salt Lake City,
Utah, was in Club Feraco, a so-called non-profit liquor
locker club, located at 923 South State Street in Salt
Lake City, Utah (R. 352). While there, Officer Caldwell
observed Libelee Mary Lou Hooley, a cocktail waitress
3
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(R. 473), solicit the sale of alcoholic beverages, he saw
Leonard Feraco, a bartender ( R. 441), pour and prepare
said alcoholic drinks and he saw :Mary Lou Hooley serve
and receive payment for said drinks of alcoholic beverage
(R. 352-357). He placed Libelees Hooley and Feraco
under arre.st (R. 355).
The history of Club Feraco and certain agents of
Club Feraco i.s a history of illegal liquor sales. Officer
Caldwell knew this (R. 356, 425, 426, 427). John Wey,
a bartender of Club Feraco, and Ross Fer.aco, a
managing officer, had been charged with the illegal sale
of liquor and had pled guilty thereto (R. 410, 413). He
had been informed that liquor purchases had been made
on various occasions (R. -t-27). An agent of the Alcohol
Tax Unit of the United States Government had purchased a series of "drinks" at Club Feraco (R. 390, 450).
Mary Lou Hooley, a cocktail waitress of Club Feraco,
had been charged with the illegal sale of liquor and had
been found guilty thereof (R. 479). He had been informed that certain Ogden Police Officers had purchased
drinks at Club Feraco (R. 430, 457-459). He had been
told that Club Feraco had a "Retail Liquor Dealers" tax
stamp frmn the Departn1ent of Internal Revenue (R. 429,
414-416). Having general knowledge of these and other
facts and observing the sale above set forth, Officer Caldwell had "reason to believe·· that one of the businesses
carried on at the pren1ises .at 923 South State Street in
Salt Lake City, was in violation of the Utah Liquor
Control Act (R. 356, 423-431). Officer Caldwell, after
4
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arresting Hooley and Leonard Feraco, as above set forth,
thereupon seized all tangible personal property including
136 bottles of liquor upon the Club premises and reduced
said property to his possession according to law (R. 368,
387-88). He forthwith n1ade cmnplaint before Judge J.
Patton Neeley, City Judge and Ex-Officio Justice of
the Peace of Salt Lake City, Utah, against Mary Lou
Hooley and Leonard Feraco and caused them to appear
before said court according to law (R. 369, 534, 535).
Officer Caldwell made a "return" and an "amended
return" to the District Court of Salt Lake County, Utah,
of said property (R. 1, 22). The court issued a "warrant
of attachment" to Officer Caldwell directing him to
"hold safely said property so seized under [his] control
until discharged by due process of law'' (R. 12, 37).
November 9, 1956, a "Libel of Information" was
filed in the District Court of S.alt Lake County and a
"Notice of Hearing and Order to Show Cause" was
issued, served and posted (R. 51, 89, 118). The "Libel of
Information" sought the condemnation and forfeiture
of the tangible personal property and alcoholic beverages
seized by Officer Caldwell (R. 51). An "answer" was
filed by narned Libelees, Club Feraco, Ross Feraco,
Leonard Feraco and Mary Lou Hooley ( R. 83). In
said answer Libelees asserted that all tangible personal
property seized belonged to Club Feraco (R. 83). Various "clairns" were filed by persons clairning ownership
in part of the property seized and the claiming parties
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were made partie~ to the action. A total of nine additional
claims were filed (R. 67, 80 82 87 120 131 132 141 278)

' ' '

'

'

,

'

.

The matter being at issue, trial in chief commenced
November 23, 1956, and concluded after intennittent
hearing on the 28th day of Xovember, 1956 (R. 349-570).
Evidence was introduced at the hearing by Libelant
as to the illegal sale of liquor above described and as
to the nature of the business being carried on at the
premises at 923 South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah.
Evidence was introduced by Libelees denying the illegal
sale of liquor and purportedly demonstrating the value
of eertain property seized (R. 468-562). None of the
persons who filed "clailns~~ offered evidence to support
their elaims at that time (R. 349-570). Club Feraco,
Ross Feraco, Leonard Feraco and ~Iary Lou Hooley at
the tennination of the hearing moved the court to dismi~~ the .. Libel of Information" (R. 46~ 569). The
n1atter wa~ taken under advise1nent (R. 5f~ Xovember
29, 1956, while the matter was under advisement, a
"rlain1'' was filed on behalf of He1nenway and lloser
C01npan~·, claiiuing ownership of two cigarette machines
and the contents thereof (R. 1-1-1). On the 13th day of
Dece1nber, 1956, while the matter was still under advisement. a ~tipulation prepared b~· counsel for Hemenway
and l\loser l 0lllpany wa~ pn'8ented to counsel for Libelant and counsel for Libelees Feraeo, Club Feraco, and
Hooley (H. 1-1-5). The ~tipulation states in part as
follows: .. That the above-deseribed property [two cigarctt<' 111aehines and conknt~J does not in any way belong
1
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I~

to s.aid Club Feraco and was kept or used only in connection with the restaurant and beer vending business
conducted on said pren1ises and was not so kept or used
in connection with any business that may have been conducted on the premises in violation of the Liquor Control
Act of the State of Utah" (R. 145). The court, on the
19th day of December, 1956, based upon the stipulation
and by order, released the cigarette n1achines and their
contents to Hernenway and Moser Company (R. 147).
The stipulation was signed by counsel for Libelant,
Counsel for Libelees Feraco, Hooley and Club Feraco
and counsel for Hemenway and Moser Company. It
wa.s signed by no other parties (R. 145).

J anu.ary 7, 1957, the court issued a "Memorandum
Decision" wherein the court found that intoxicating
liquors were sold at Club Feraco; that intoxicating
liquors were sold in the presence of Officer Caldwell;
that Libelees Hooley, Feraco and Club Feraco, and one
claimant, Hemenway and Moser Company, had stipulated
that the restaurant business conducted on the prernises
was not connected with the illegal liquor business; that
property illegally seized was not subject to forfeiture;
that property legally seized was subject to forfeiture
(R. 148).
Thereafter, on or about the 22nd day of .Jan., 1957,
Libelees Hooley, Feraco and Club Feraco, moved the
court for the return of certain personal property ( R.
167). Their counsel also filed a stipulation purportedly
executed by Libelees Feraco, Club Feraco, Hooley, Dohr-
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rnann Hotel Supply Cmnpany, Stevens Rosehill Dairy,
Cliff Krantz, Morrison Brothers, Hobart Sales Agency,
Ethel M. Doheny and National Cash Register Company.
This stipulation provides in part: "That any property
that may be ordered returned by the above-entitled court
to said Club Feraco premises may be so retained and
said claimants hereby forego and relinquish any claim
thereto asserted in the above-entitled cause as to any of
said items that may be ordered returned" (R. 168).
Hearing was held January 24, 1957, to allow claimant~ to appear and put on evidence to show cause why
the tangible personal property for which they made claim
should not be forfeited by the court (R. 571). The record
indicates that only the following claimants appeared:
Libelees Feraco, Hooley, and Club Feraco; Cliff Krantz;
Ethel ~I. Doheny: and Xational Cash Register Company
(R. :171, 641). In compliance with hi~ rnemorandum deci~ion, the court rnade son1e effort to determine what
portion of the property seized was "restaurant" property
and what portion of the property seized was "liquor"
property (R. 571 ). Libelant, for the purpose of aiding the
court, offered to ronrede that certain items were used
primaril~· in the ~o-e<llled "restaurant business;" certain
items wPrP used primarily in the illegal liquor business;
and c·Prtain items were used in both (R. 574). Counsel
for LilH'Iant, in hi~ pffnrts to aid the rourt, attempted to
indir.atP tJw phy~ieallocation of the items in controversy.
Jn doing so, c·ounsPI stu ted to the court that it was done to
aid thP rourt, but qualified his doing so by stating:
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" ... in separating the items as we previously did this
morning, that we are not consenting that they were not
part and parcel of the illegal business ... " (R. 631, 639).
During the hearing on the 24th day of January,
Libelees Feraco, Club Feraco, Hooley, and Doheny offered no testimony to su.stain their statutory burden of
showing that "said tangible personal property or some
parts thereof were not used for any purpose whatsoever
in connection with the operation of the business conducted on the premises where said personal property
was seized" (See 32-8-20 Utah Code Annotated, 1953).
Libelee Leonard Feraco "filed" an Affidavit with the
court and all Libelees rested (R. 215, 572, 636). The
court "cautioned" :Mr. Bridwell as to the Affidavit,
stating "Mr. Bridwell, an affidavit filed is evidence for
some purposes. It isn't regarded as-Inay I say-firstclass evidence in disputed matters because it isn't subject to cross exmnination and, for most purposes, affidavits are not received and considered as evidence on
the vital issues of a matter in litigation. It is somewhat like hearsay evidence, because it isn't subject to
testing by cro.ss examination. I make that com1nent for
your consideration" (R. 636).
Nothing in the record indicates that the purported
Affidavit was ever received in evidence (R. 636). Its
reception was objected to by Libelant (R. 636). In effect,
other than certain limited testiinony offered by Cliff
Krantz and certain limited testimony and docuinent~ of-
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fered by National Cash Register Company and certain
contracts offered by Mrs. Doheny no testimony was offered by Libelees to sustain their admitted burden of
proof (R. 639-642).
The court entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law and Decree on the 29th day of January, 1957.
In the decree, the court classified certain property as
"restaurant" property and ordered that such property
be returned to Libelees. The court classified certain
property as "liquor" property and ordered that such
property be forfeited and sold. The court, neither in
its findings of fact nor in its conclusions of law, specifically differentiated the property classified in the decree and judgment (R. 187-204).
February 1, 1957, Libelant filed with the court a
''Motion for a New Trial as to the Return of Certain
Tangible Personal Property" alleging (1) newly discovered evidence ; ( 2) insufficiency of evidence to support the judgment to return certain property; and (3)
error in law (R. 226). February 5, 1957, Libelant filed
a "Motion to A1nend and Supplen1ent Findings of Fact
and Conclusion of Law and J udg1nent,'' alleging the
rea.sons for the nwtion and setting forth the proposed
corrective mnendnu~nts (R. 237). Both n1otions were considered by the court on the 5th day of February, 1957 (R.
266). The court, on the 9th day of February, 1957, denied both nwtions of Libelant (R. 266).
February 17, 1957, counsel for Libelees Hooley,
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Feraco and Club Feraco Inoved the court to set aside
the judg1nent of the court which motion was denied (R.
:282, 328).
February 20, 1957, George Bridwell, counsel for
Libelees, upon an oral ex-parte application, without notice to Libelant, obtained an order for the sale of the
forfeited property from Judge Martin Larson (R. 299).
S.aid order was neither filed with nor issued by the Clerk
of Court ( R. 327, 328, 329). No minute entry was made
of said order (R. 327-329). It was neither sealed nor
authenticated, nor was it directed to the person having
custody of the property (R. 299). It was improperly
posted (R. 305).
March 2, 1957, the Sheriff of Salt Lake County sold
for the sum of $10.00 the items declared forfeited to
the State of Utah, including cash 1nany times in excess
of $10.00 (R. 305).
March 6, 1957, Counsel for Libelant filed a "Motion
to Quash and Declare of No Effect the Purported Order
of Sale and the Purported Sale of Certain Personal
Property" (R. 336). Filed and issued on the same day
was "Petition and Order to Show Cause" (R. 292) .
.March 7, 1957, Libelees filed a "Notice of Cross
Appeal" (R. 298).
March 19, 1957, the court heard arguments to quash
the purported sale and motion for order to show cause,
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and the matter was taken under advisement (R. 330).
The matter is still under advisement.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE CLASSIFICATION BY THE TRIAL JUDGE OF
SEIZED PROPERTY AS EITHER "RESTAURANT" OR
"LIQUOR" AND HIS A•CTION IN ORDERING THAT THE
"RESTAURANT" PROPERTY BE RETURNED TO LIBELEES WAS UNSUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND WAS
CONTRARY TO LAW.
POINT II.
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT LIBELANT'S MOTION TO AMEND AND SUPPLEMENT THE
COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
TO MODIFY THE JUDGMENT.
POINT III.
CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS CANNOT BE RAISED
FOR FIRST TIME ON APPEAL.
POINT IV.
ACQUITTAL IN CRIMINAL ACTION HAS NO BEARING
ON FORFEITURE OF PROPERTY UNDER LIBEL OF INFORMATION.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE CLASSIFICATION BY THE TRIAL JUDGE OF
SEIZED PROPERTY AS EITHER "RESTAURANT" OR
"LIQUOR" AND HIS A•CTION IN ORDERING THAT THE
"RESTAURANT" PROPERTY BE RETURNED TO LIBELEES WAS UNSUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND WAS
CONTRARY TO LAW.
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(a) The statute establishes a presumption that all
tangible personal property on the prernises was used in
connection with violation of the Utah Liquor Control
Act and accordingly gives claimants the burden of proving to the satisfaction of the court that their property
was not used for any purpose whatsoever in connection
with the operation of the business conducted on the
premises where said personal property was seized.
The statute in question, Section 32-8-20, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, sets forth the proper procedure to be
followed by the court following seizure, pursuant to
Section 32-8-17, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. Section
32-8-20, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides in part as
follows:
"At the time and place fixed in the notice
the person named in the information, or any person claiming any interest in such alcoholic beverages, or tangible personal property, or any part
thereof, may appear and show cause why the same
should not be forfeited. If .any person shall so appear he shall become a party defendant in the
cause and the court shall make a record thereof.
*** If the court shall find from the evidence presented that violations of this act did occur upon
the premise wherein said alcoholic beverages or
other tangible personal property so seized by the
arresting officer was located, then he shall also
find that all tangible personal property so seized
by said arresting officer which was located
upon said premises was also used in connection
with violation of this act and shall be forfeited as
hereafter provided unless any of the claimants
prove to the satisfaction of the court that said
tangible personal property or some parts thereof
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were not used for any purpose whatsoever in connection with the operation of the business conducted on the premises where said personal
property was seized *** ." (Italics added.)
The above statute is simple and direct. Once finding that a violation of the act has occurred in the premises in que.stion, the court has the mandatory duty under
this statute to further find that all tangible personal
property seized on the premises was used in connection
with said violations. The only way a claimant can thereafter save his property from forfeiture is to come to
court and prove that his property was not used for any
purpose whatsoever in connection with the operation of
the business conducted on the premises. (Emphasis
added.) It can be noted at this point that the statute
makes no mention of a claimant being required to show
that his property was not connected with liquor. The
statute requires a showing that such property was not
connected with the business conducted on the premises.
The interpretation of the afore1nentioned statute is so
obvious as to m ake it unnecessary to belabor the point
further that once having found the Yiolation, the burden
is on the claimant to show that his property falls without
the confines of the statute.
1

(b) The Libelees Feraco and Hooley and other
claimants presented no evidence tending to show that
any tangible personal property in Club Feraeo was not
used for any purpose in connection with the operation
of the business conducted thereon.
The record of the first hearing at which the trial
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judge carne up with the conclusions that there were two
types of property in Club Feraco, ''restaurant" property
and "liquor" property, is completely barren of any evidence presented on behalf of these Libelees tending to
show even remotely that any property in the club fell
out.side of the statute. The evidence at said hearing
was confined primarily to the question of whether or
not there had been an illegal sale of alcoholic beverage
at Club Feraco at the time in question. The complete
void in the record on thi.s point demanded a forfeiture
of all property seized at Club Feraco at the time in question.
In the case of H ernenway q Moser C ornpany, et al
v. Funk, 100 U. 72, 106 P. 2d 779, it was stated at page
784,
"Proof of the violation of the act in the absence of a contest is sufficient to justify a decision
by the court against the property, or in case of
a contest to compel the claimant to prove that his
property w.as not so used in violation of the act,
or as a part of the business wherein part of the
business was a violation of the act; or that a business in violation of the act was not conducted on
the premises."
In this case, the court interpreted the provisions of Chapter 43, Par. 168, Laws of Utah, 1935, now Section 32-8-20,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953. The court in this case stated
that the Liquor Control Act should be liberally con.strued
in order to elirninate the evils of unlicensed and unlawful
manufacture, sale and disposition of alcoholic beverages.
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The eourt imposed the burden on Libelees .as set forth
Point I (a) supra.
(c) At the initial hearing Libelant produced affirmative evidence to the effect that liquor was dispensed
uniformily throughout the premise.s where the property
in question was seized.
At R. 438 and 439 the tes~tirnony of Ross Feraco, a
former manager of Club Feraco, is contained in respect
to the dispensing of liquor at the premises in question:
"Q.

Now is any other business conducted there?

A.

Food.

Q.

Food is served there 1

A.

That's right.

Q.

During that time that food was served to
these people, do you know whether, on any
occa.sion that you can recall, these people
had a drink while they were eating their
dinnerf

A.

If they bring their bottles in there and order
their drinks, you bet.

Q.

They were served drinks at the table when
eating?

A. Yes.

Q.

Now, were people served n1ixed drinks any
place else in the club other than the portion
where they were eating?
16
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A.

Served anywhere in the club.

Q.

Anywhere in the club."

This evidence concerning the connection of the restaurant to the liquor at the first hearing conclusively
shows that the imaginary splitting of the premises into
two parts is entirely unfounded. There was no contrary
evidence. The restaurant area and dancing area are contiguous and not separated (R. 393, 518-521). Ross Feraco
testified that n1ixed drinks were served in all parts of the
club whether it be re.staurant area, bar area, or dancing·
area. This evidence shows as utterly ridiculous any
atten1pt to artificially dissect one are.a of the club from
another in regard to forfeiture of property. ·The statute
aforesaid obviously makes the entire business conducted
in the club as a whole illegal when the law is violated
and accordingly subjects .all tangible personal property
to forfeiture. Any other interpretation could only lead
to confusion and frustration of the law.
The testimony of Libelees showed that Club Feraco
was not operated as a coinmercial enterprise but as a
non-profit club with the sole purpose of providing entertainment for meinber.s .and their guests. In view of this
testimony the trial court's classification of a liquor business and a restaurant business being conducted separately under the same roof appears to be even Inore erroneous
(R. 520, 521).
Libelant, after the initial he.aring, produced uncontroverted te.stimony of the illegal sale of alcoholic bev-
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erages in Club Feraco (R. 600-632).
(d) The trial judge Inisinterpreted the stipulation
agreeing to release certain items of personal property
to Hemenway & Moser Cmnpany and read into said
stipulation a sweeping admission by the Libelant that
re.staurant property w.as not connected with the business being conducted on the premises of Club Feraco,
in violation of the Utah Liquor Control Act.
Subsequent to the first hearing on this matter and
after all of the evidence had been presented as to the
violation .and any possible personal property falling
without the statute, the Libelant, through its attorney,
entered into a stipulation with claimant Hemenway &
Moser Company and Libelees Feraco and Hooley to the
effect that certain cigarette vending machines and cigarettes within could be released to the said Hemenway
& Moser Company (R. 145).
The trial judge seized on certain language contained
1n the stipulation to solve the question as to the forfeiture of the seized property. The language which was
used as the panacea to the problen1 was as follows (R.
145):
"2. That the .above described property does
not in an~· way belong to s.aid Club Feraco and
was kept or used only in connection "ith the
restaurant and heer vending business conducted
on the premises and \Y<ls not so kept or used in
connection with any business that n1ay have been
<'onducted on the premises in Yiolation of the
Liquor Control Act of the State of Utah."
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The trial court, in his opinion interpreted this language as follows that there w.as no connection between
the cafe or restaurant and the bar or liquor business.
lt is exceedingly difficult to imagine how the trial
court so interpreted the aforesaid stipulation. The purpose of the stipulation was to release certain specific
items of property which were not felt to be .a part of the
business conduCJted on the premises. From this, the trial
court felt that Libelant had stipulated that all property
having anything to do with the serving of food was not
a part of Club Feraco's business. This reasoning on the
part of the trial court .also stems from a basic misunderstanding of the provisions of Section 32-8-20, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, that items of property are exempt if
they have nothing to do with liquor. It will be remembered thaJt the statute places the burden on the claimant
of proving "to the satisfaction of the court that s.aid
tangible personal property or some parts thereof were
not used for any purpose whatsoever in connection with
the operaJtion of the business condu0ted on the premises
where said personal property was seized." (Emphasis
added.)

The statute requires no connection with the business;
it does not require a connection with liquor. Once the
viol.ation is found, the entire business as such, is illegal,
and all tangible personal property used in such business
is subject to forfeiture. A claiinant Inust show no connection with the business and cannot be let off Inerely showing no connection with liquor.
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It will be remeinbered that Ross Feraco stated that
liquor was dispensed in all parts of the club. The trial
judge apparently overlooked this testimony when he
ruled in his opinion that there was no evidence offered
or given to show that the restaurant business was in any
way a part of, or connected with, the liquor or bar business.
The trial judge obviously warped and stretched
the stipulation as to certain specific items of property
to an entire section of the illegal business conducted at
Club Feraco.
(e) Parties to the action cannot change the court's
duties under the law by stipulation.
The language of the statute regarding the procedure
and burden in an in rem action for the forfeiture of property is clear as to the duties of the trial court. The following excerpt frmn 32-8-20, r tah Code Annotated, 1953,
indicate.s the particular duty of the trial court, after the
finding of fact (Finding of Fart YI [R. 188] ) made
by the court to the effect that there was a violation of
the Utah Liquor Control Act. to-wit:

"* * *If the court shall find from the evidence
presented that violation of this act did occur upon
the prmnise wherein said alcoholic beverages or
other tangible personal property so seized,..by the
arresting officer was located, then he shall also
find that all tau!fiblc persoual property so seized
by said arresting officer "·hirh was located upon
said pren1ises was also used in connection with
20
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violation of this act and shall be forfeited as hereafter provided, unless any of the claimants prove
to the satisfaction of the court that said tangible
personal property or smne parts thereof were not
used for any purpose whatsoever in connection
with the operation of the business conducted on
the premises where said personal property was
seized." (Emphasis added.)
The trial court having made the initial finding that
there was sale of liquor on the premises of Club Feraco
in violation of the Utah Liquor Control Act, it must also
find that all tangible personal property seized upon said
premises was used in connection with the violation and
must be forfeited. That claimants have the burden of
proving that the tangible personal property seized by
the officers at Club Feraco was not used for any purpose
whatsoever in connection with the business conducted
on the premises before the court is relieved of its duty.
The claimants have failed to sustain their burden of
proof as required in the above statute, therefore the
seized property must be forfeited.
The trial court, disregarding the mandatory language of the statute and disregarding its finding of a
violation of the Utah Liquor Control Act, stated that
counsel had stipulated to the effect that the "restaurant"
and "liquor" business conducted at Club Feraco had no
connection, and concluded therefore, that "restaurant"
property cannot be forfeited for a liquor violation. This
is a most distorted conclusion to draw from said stipulation. The stipulation is clearly for the purpose of aid-
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ing the court in making what was determined to be an
proper release of property of one of the claimants.
Its meaning must be confined to the wording thereof,
which limits the extent of the stipulation narrowly. To
stipulate that another claimant owned certain property
and that the property was not used by Club Feraco in its
busines;s, is not to stipulate that all property seized is of
two kinds-"liquor" or "restaurant," nor is it to stipulate, as the trial court believes, that there was no connection as to all the property seized between the "restaurant"
and "liquor" bu.siness.
The single requirement of the statute, before seized
property may be forfeited, following a finding of a violation, as the trial court here found, is that the property
be "also used in connection with violation of this act."
(32-8-20, U.C.A. 1953) Some evidence on this point is
that of Ross Feraco to the effect that 1nixed drinks were
served .anywhere in Club Feraco (R. 438, 439). Certainly,
the entire record describes a picture of one establishment-Club Feraco-engaged in selling food and drink,
and furnishing entertainment for its members, but with
no distinotion whatever that there were separate "businesses" for "restaurant" purposes and "liquor" purposes.
The trial court erred in using the stipulation of the
parties regarding the cigarette vending 1nachines and the
contents thereof, as a 1neans of avoiding its statutory
duty. The language of the stipulation is clearly restricted
to the property listed therein and cannot fairly be taken
to express the 1neaning concluded by the trial court.
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However, whether accepting the view of the stipulation taken by the trial court or that expressed in this
brief, the sound reasoning of rnany courts indicates that
the parties cannot by stipulation alter the statutory duty
of the trial court. In the recent case of State v. Christensen, 166 Kan. 152, 199 P. 2d -1:75, 479 (1948), the court
said:
"The authorities overwhelmingly support the
conclusion we have felt compelled to reach in this
case. The power of public officers and the jurisdiction of court.s are to be found in the statutes
and n1ay not be conferred by stipulation or otherwise. 14 Arn. Jr. 380, § 184; 21 C.J.S., Courts§ 35,
page 45. Parties to litigation cannot validly stipulate as to what the law is, how a statute is to be
construed, or what its effect is (50 Am. J ur. 607,
§ 5, 92 A.L.R. 664, 669-670) at least as to matters
of public concern (50 Am. J ur. 607, § 4; 608, § 5 ;
92 A.L.R. 666). 'The proper administration of
the criminal law cannot be left merely to the stipulation of parties.' Young v. United States, 315
U.S. 257, ... Even in civil actions it is held that
the parties may not stipulate for a determination
in a manner contrary to the statutes. In re Meridith's Estate, 275 Mich. 278, 266 N.W. 351, 104
A.L.R. 348."
The case of In re Meredith's Estate, 275 Mich. 278,
266 N.W. 351, 355 (1936), which is cited by the Christensen case above seems to be a leading authority for this
proposition and states as follows:
"Parties cannot by agreement .supersede the
essential regulations made by law for the investi23
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gatwn of causes, and by stipulation set aside the
statutory method prescribed for determining the
mental capacity of the testator. Harris v. Sweetland, 48 Mich. 110, 11 N.W. 830."

"Parties even to a civil cause may not stipulate for the detennination of the same by the trial
court in a manner contrary to the statutes or rules
of court. Kohn v. Columbia Nat. Bank, 165 Ill.
316, 46 N .E. 208.

"Much less is a stipulation valid which changes
the method of procedure in proceedings in rem
and submits the detennination of the mental competency of a testator to one man other than the
pro bate judge."
This principle has been recognized by the United States
Supreme Court in the case of Swift and Company v.
Hocking Valley R. Company_. 243 r.S. 281, 289 (1916):
"If the stipulation is to be treated as an
agreement concerning the legal effect of admitted
facts, it is obviously inoperative: since the court
cannot be controlled by .agree1nent of counsel on a
subsidiary question of law .... ·The duty of this
court, as of every judicial tribunal, is limited to
detennining rights of persons or of property.
which are actually controverted in the particular
case before it . . . No stipulation of parties or
counsel, whether in the case before the court or in
any other ease, can enlarge the power. or affect
the duty of the court in this regard."
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Ordinarily the parties are bound by stipulations of
fae.t which are e1nployed in an evidentiary sense .and not
as conclusions binding on the courts, however, the courts
mar discharge stipulations entered into irnprovidently
in order to accmnplish justice. See Malone v. Bianchi,
Mass., 61 N.E. 2d 1 ( 1945) and further citations listed
therein. The intent of the parties in entering into the
stipulation should be the controlling criterion for those
stipulations that are found to be of binding effect. This
concept was recognized in the case of First-Mechanics
Nat. Bank v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., 117 F. 2d 127,
131 (1940):
"This is clearly a misinterpretation of the
purport of the stipulation . . . . The stipulation
was not intended to be nor could it properly be
construed as being substantive proof of the fact
of mistake as .alleged.... Consequently, the Board
was not precluded thereby from drawing a conclusion to the contrary from the admitted facts. The
legal effect of the indisputable facts, appearing of
record, was for the Board, and for this court on
review, regardless of the stipulation." (citations
omitted)
The overall intent of the parties has been looked to even
when the stipulation is obviously inconsistent with the
allegations later made. See State v. Martin, 23 Mo. 1,
129 S.W. 931, 936 (1910), a state liquor prosecution in
which the stipulation that a drink was non-intoxicating
was subverted by later testimony which negated the
stipulation.
Irrespective of the duty of the trial court and the
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intent of the parties~ it if3 \vell recognized that the parties
cannot determine the law hy stipulation. In a criminal
action, State v. Green, 167 Wash. 266, 9 P. 2d 62, 63
(1932), it was stated that:
"If we _should permit the parties by stipulation or agreement to determine the law, we might
establish precedents which would be embarrassing."
As was declared in Young v. United States, 315 U.S. 257,
259 (1941), and quoted in many decisions and annotations:
"The public interest that a re·sult be reached
which promotes a well-ordered society is foremost
in every criminal proceeding. That interest is entrusted to our con.sideration and protection as well
as to that of the enforcing officers. Furthermore,
our judgments are precedents, and the proper
administration of the criminal law cannot be left
merely to the stipulation of the parties." (citations
omitted)
While the instant ease is not exclusively a criminal
action, it is based upon the enforcen1ent of sanction arising fron1 the illegal sale of liquor, a crime. This is not
determinative, however, since the doctrine that the parties cannot detern1ine the law by stipulation is applicable
to civil suits as well. In the case of X orth Platte Lodge
985, B.P.O.E. v. Board of Equali.zation,, 125 Neb. 841, :252
N.vV. 313, 31+ (1934), the court stated the following in
con.sidering the question of stipulation against the public
interest in a civil suit:
26
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"The decision of these rnatters will necessarily
affect the substantial interest of the general public. This stipulation emphasizes the necessity and
importance of adherence in this class of cases to
the following commonly accepted principles of
procedure, viz: 'While litigants have the undoubted right to stipulate as to the facts, it is very
generally held that it is not competent for them to
stipulate as to what the law is so as to bind the
court, and that such stipulations will be disregarded. Decisions of questions of law must rest
upon the judgment of the court, uninfluenced by
stipulations of the parties or counsel ... as to the
existence of a law, as to its validity or invalidity
. . . as to the legal conclusion from a given state
of fact.s as to the legal effect of a contract. 60

C.J. 50."
In other vvords, "**':« the people of the state are entitled
to know what is the law on public questions, rather than
what we find it to be upon agreement of parties." Ford
v. Dilley, 174 Iowa 243,250; 156 N.W. Rep. citation, N.W.
513, 517. A sin1ilar problern confronted the court in In
re Dardis' Will, 135 Wis. 457, 115 N.W. 332, 333 (1909),
wherein it was said:
" ... the proceeding to probate a will is a proceeding in rem, binding all the world, and in which
even public welfare and policy is involved. The
view that public interest requires that a valid will
be established, independently of the wish of those
parties specifically named therein, is evidenced by
various statutes in this ,state . . a positive duty is
imposed both upon the county judge as a public
officer . . . to take steps to bring the question of
its validity before the proper probate court....
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[p. 334] All these steps are imposed by law
wholly independent of the control of those privately interested. They evince a clear recognition and
declaration by the Legislature that there is a
public policy involved in the establishment of
every legally executed will. ***"

* * *
" ... courts cannot be compelled to disregard
to accommodate the wishes of some or even all
parties having pecuniary interest in the property.
". . . the considerations which we have above
suggested of the possible interest of unknown parties and of the existence of a public policy to protect them. . . . This conclusion seems to be supported by the great weight of authority." (citations omitted).

* * *
"We conclude that the stipulation in this case
could not control the duty which the probate court
owed to the public, and perhaps to the testator,
to adjudicate as to the legal existence of the propounded document as a will - to establish its
status."
For a more recent case see People v. Levisen, 404 Ill. 574,
90 N.E. 2d 213, 216 (1950), "It is the province of the
court to detennine what the legislature meant. . . . .,
That a strong public intere~t is established in the
enforce1nent of the sate liquor law~ i~ patent in the statutes and the deeisions of this state. Duties are imposed
on the courts with a legitin1ate purpose in 1nind by the
legislatun', and that purpose is to safeguard the public
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interest in the outcorne of the decisiOns. That these
duties should not be disregarded lightly is obvious.
Rather than construe a stipulation that flaunts such
duties broadly it should be construed strictly and when
found in serious conflict with the duty or any public
interest it should be disregarded.
There are other principles which declare that the
stipulation in the instant case was either invalid ab initio
or at least irnproperly ernployed by the trial court. It is
established beyond reasonable question that the parties
cannot bind the court by stipulating as to the conclusions
to be drawn frmn the facts, Minneapolis Brewing Co. v.
Merritt, 143 F. Supp. 146, 149 (1956):
''A stipulation of material facts is ordinarily
proper, but parties cannot bind the court by stipulation as to the law." (citations omitted) "Nor can
they do so by stipulation as to the legal effect of
admitted facts." (citations omitted)

Tyan v. KSTP, Inc., ______ Minn. ______ , 77 N.W. 2d 200, 205

(1956):
"We are not bound to treat the stipulations
entered into as an agreement concerning the legal
effect of .admitted facts. The stipulations would
not be operative in that regard. The court cannot
be controlled by agreement of counsel on a subsidiary que.stion of law.... This court must decide questions of law here involved, uninfluenced
by stipulations of the parties or of counsel."

Valdez v. Taylor Automobile Company, ______ Cal. ______ , 278
P. 2d 91, 97 (1954):
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" ... lt was a stipulation as to the legal effect of
the facts-a conclusion of law. And as we shall
see it was an erroneous conclusion from the facts
and as such is not binding on this court .... "
Ex Parte Higgs, ______ Okla. ______ , 263 P. 2d 752, 761 (1953):

". . . in interpreting a legislative act courts
are not compelled to abdicate to the stipulations
of the parties."
See also Hahn v. lvational Casualty Compally) 64 Idaho
684, 136 P. 2d 739, 741 (1943); Ex Parte Day, 127 Tex.
Criminal Rpts. 367, 76 S.\Y. 2d 1060, 1065 (1934). The
stipulation in the instant case wa.s one which, as interpreted by the trial court, established the ultimate facts
of the case in regards to certain property, i.e., was the
property connected with the illegal liquor business conducted on the premises.
In the case of Platt v. D n ited States, 163 F. :2d 165,
168 (1947), the Federal court had this to say about this
type of stipulation:
""It i.s doubtful if the staten1ent by appellant's
attorney in respect to this n1atter can be construed
.as a stipulation as to a finding of fact, but, in any
event, parties 1nay not stipulate the findings of
fact upon \\~hich conclusions of law and the judgment of the court are to be based. Parties may by
stipulation establish evidentiary facts to obviate
the necessit~- of offering proof, but based thereon
the court n1ust 1tself find the ultin1ate facts upon
which the conclusions of law and the judgn1ents
are based."
Under the !'acts as deduced at the trial, the stipulation,
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as interpreted by the trial court, is contrary to both the
facts and the law. To conclude that all the property used
in the "restaurant" business could have no connection
with the liquor business is ab.surd. This same anamoly
was confronted in the case of People v. Shifrin, 198 Misc.
348, 101 N.Y.S. 2d 613, 616 (1950):
"The defendant's contention that the place of
business is a farmers' market and therefore exempt from the prohibitions of the statute has no
pre.suasive force . . . . It is the type of business
conducted which governs and the stipulation c.annot change the fact or the law; neither can the
parties by stipulation make ineffective the operation of the statute where in fact a violation exists."
(citations omitted).
In the instant case, only three of the cl.aimants in the
action were parties to the stipulation. It is well settled
law that a stipulation cannot bind those not a party to it.
In Arnett v. Throop, 75 Idaho 331, 272 P. 2d 308, 310
(1954), it was recognized that:
"A valid stipulation binds the p.arties thereto, but parties to an action cannot by stipulation
affect third parties' rights and persons not parties
to the stipulations." (citations omitted)
For a federal case in accord see Kneeland v. Luce, 141
U.S. 437 (1891). In the case of In re Dardis' Will, 135
Wis. 457, 115 N.W. 332, (1908), the court held that the
fact that all the parties in interest did not sign the stipulation was a valid reason not to enforce the stipulation.
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Especially is thi~ so in an in rem action where the rights
to property are settled as to the whole world; a few cannot stipulate away the rights of others who might have
an interest in the property. This is the effect of the trial
court interpretation of the stipulation in the instant case.
Since thi.s question is one apparently of first impression in this state, the appellant has attempted to present
the law to the court for consideration. It appears to be
without question that the actions of the trial court in
respect to the stipulation made therein was improper.
Since the conclusion establishes a rather dangerous precedent of authorizing public officials by direct action of
the courts by liberal interpretation to stipulate away the
rights of the public as established by legislation, the result warrants serious consideration. Additional support
for the conclusions requested herein may be found in
an extensive annotation on the subject in 92 A.L.R. 663.
POINT II.
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT LIBELANT'S MOTION TO AMEND AND SUPPLEMENT THE
COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
TO MODIFY THE JUDGMENT.

The court made numerous findings on immaterial
matters for which there is insufficient support in the
rHcord. It failed to n1ake certain petinent findings for
which there is runple support in the record.
(a) The court u1ade nu1nerous findings on im1naterial1natters which, even if nmterial, find insufficient
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support in the record. Such "findings" encumber the
record, confuse the issue, .and offer no valid basis for any
conclusion of law. Examples of such are Findings of Fact
Number X and XI which deal with purported conversations of :Mr. Bridwell and the county attorney, and Mr.
Bridwell and the chief of police (R. 189). Additional
examples are Findings XY, XVI, XVII, XVIII, XIX,
XX, XXI, XXII, which have to do with alleged damage
to the seized properly (R. 190-192). Another example is
that part of Finding XXVI, which recites a request by
Libellee Club Feraco addressed to the Bureau of Internal
Revenue for cancellation of a federal alcohol tax stamp
(Retail Dealers Tax Stmnp) after the date of the alleged
offense (R. 193).
(b) The court failed to make certain pertinent
findings for which there is an1ple support in the record.
The court f.ailed to find that during the period Club
Feraco had a retail liquor dealers tax stamp that it allowed per.sons to have, hold, store and posses liquor on
the premises of Club Feraco. (Proposed Amendment
Number 20 a and b [R. 239, 240] ). The court failed to
find that no evidence was introduced by Club Fer.aco,
nor any other claimant that the tangible personal properly, nor any parts thereof were not used for any purpose
whatsoever in connection with the operation of the business conducted on the premises of Club Feraco (R. 187204). ~or did it find that evidence was introduced that
there was no connection with the tangible personal property and the busine.ss conducted on the premises, which
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finding would certainly be necessary to sustain its order
to return property (R. 187-204). The court erred in making conclusions IV and V (R. 193, 194). The conclusions
are neither Inaterial nor relevant, nor do they have adequate foundation in fact. They, in fact, are conclusions
manufactured out of the whole cloth and have no bearing on the issues in this ca.se.
The court erred in failing to modify its judgment in
at least three particulars: It erred in directing the Sher-

iff of Salt Lake County to sell the forfeited property;
it erred in directing the Sheriff of Salt Lake County to
destroy the seized alcoholic beverages; it erred in directing that each party bear its own costs (R. 195-204).
The officer directed to sell the forfeited property,
had neither possession nor control of the forfeited property. He is not authorized by statute to sell said property.
The court issued its warrant of attachment to Officer
Philip Ralph Caldwell, com1nanding him to hold safely
the property so seized in hi.s possession .. until discharged
by law." 32-8-24, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides as
follows:
"If the property, except alcoholic beverage
so seized, can be used for lawful purposes and in
the discretion of the court the public interest
would be ~erYed by selling instead of de.stroying
the same, the court shall direct the office'!· to sell
such property at public auction * • *" (Emphasis
added.)
The offieer referred to throughout the Liquor Con34
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trol Act is the seizing officer to which the court issues its
warrant to hold said property safely. This is further
born out by the language in the same section, wherein
the statute provides "whenever it shall be finally decided
that any alcoholic beverages or other property so seized
.are not liable to forfeiture, the court by whom such final
decision shall be rendered shall issue a written order to
the officer having the sa1ne in custody or to some other
peace office, to restore said alcoholic beverages * * * ."
The distinction between the officer holding the property
and other peace officers is clearly distinguishable in this
section. The case of Woolum v. Commonwealth, 295 S.W.
1029, decided by the Court of Appeals of Kentucky, June
24, 1927, is a c.ase wherein the Sheriff was authorized
by statute to conduct forfeiture sales. The court ordered
the Chief of Police to sell a forfeited automobile. The
court therein states at 1030 :
"In adjudging a forfeiture of appeilants car,
the lower court directed that it be advertised and
sold by the chief of police of Harland. This w.as
error, as section 2554al2, Kentucky Statutes,
provides that all such sales shall be made by the
Sheriff."
We submit that the court was in error in directing
the sheriff to sell the forfeited property. The seizing
officer and only the seizing officer was entitled to carry
out such sale. We submit that the s.ame reasoning applies
in relationship to the destruction of seized alcoholic
beverages, and that the court was in error in directing
an officer not authorized by .s~tatute to do so.
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POINT III.
CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS CANNOT BE RAISED
14'0R FIRST TIME ON APPEAL.

Points III, IV, V and VI of Libelees and Respondents and Cross Appellants brief improperly attempt to
place before this court questions of constitutionality
never raised in the trial court. Timely assertions of
Libelee's intention to que.stion the statutes in the Liquor
Control Act, under which the proceeding was conducted,
were never rnade, nor were any protective rights of person and property guaranteed by the Utah and Federal
Constitutions interposed in defense at any stage of the
proceeding. The failure of Libelees to raise such questions at the earliest opportunity, constitutes a complete
waiver thereof. It is too late, at this stage, the final
chapter of the case, to complain, although we are forced
to admit that opposing counsel has indeed complained in
superlatives.
The law is clearly and succinctly stated in W illoughby v. lVilloughby, 178 Kan. 62, 283 P. 2d 428, at 432, as
follows:
"Defendant raises for the first time on this
appeal the question of the constitutionality of
section 60-1518. By his cross-petition, he sought
affirmative relief under this statute. At no time
did he question the constitutionality of the statute
in the court below, either in his pleadings or on
his motion for new trial. But on the contrary, on
his theory of the ease the issues were narrowed
and tried solely upon the rights of the parties
under the rnentioned statute. It is the general
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rule that when a litigant desire.s to question the
constitutionality of a statute involved in a case,
he should do so at the earliest opportunity, or it
will be considered waived. Owen v. Mutual Benefit Health & Accident A~s'n, 171 Kan. 457, 233 P.
2d 706. A constitutional right rnay be forfeited
in civil as well as criminal cases by the failure to
make tinrely as.sertion of the right before a tribunal having jurisdiction to determine it. Y.akus v.
United States, 321 U.S. 414, 64 S. Ct. 660, 88 L.
Ed. 834. A party rnay waive his right to question
the constitutionality of a statute by proceeding
under it. 11 Am. J ur. 772; see, also, 16 C.J.S.,
Constitutional Law, § 96, p. 225; Missionary Baptist State Convention v. Wimberly Chapel Baptist
Church, 170 K.an. 684, 228 P. 2d 540; Stelling v.
Kansas City, 85 l{an. 397, 116 P. 511. Inasmuch
as defendant predicated his defense and asked
affirmative relief under the mentioned statute,
and at no time questioned its constitutionality in
the trial court, either by pleading or motion for
new tri.al, it does not lie within his mouth at this
late date to question the same on appellate review.
Accordingly, the question is not before this court."
Even assuming constitutional questions may be raised
initially in the Supreme Court, the Liquor Control Act
has pas.sed the scrutiny of the Utah Supreme Court on the
question of its validity on numerous occasions.
See Riggins v. District Court of Salt Lake County,
89 Utah 183, 51 P. 2d 645; Hemenway & Moser Company
v. Funk, 100 Utah 72, 106 P. 2d 779; Utah Mfrs.' Ass'n.
v. Stewart, 82 Utah 198, 23 P. 2d 229, and State v. Kallas,
97 Utah 492, 94 P. 2d 414.
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POINT IV.
ACQUITTAL IN CRIMINAL ACTION HAS NO BEARING
ON FORFEI'TURE OF PROPERTY UNDER LIBEL OF INFORMATION.

Counsel for Libelees, Respondents and Cross Appellants states in Point II of his brief: "The trial court
abused its equity discretion in refusing to set aside its
judgment of sale and forfeiture of property because of
the acquittal of Mary Hooley and Leonard Feraco of the
very crime upon which the seizure of all property was
predicated. "
Counsel's argument was answered by the Supreme
Court of the State of Utah in the year 1918, in the case of
State v. Certain Intoxicating Liquors, et al., 177 P. 235,
236, wherein the court stated:
"The acquittal of the defendant in the municipal court of Ogden City had no bearing on the
issues involved in this action. This proceeding
was directed wholly against the liquors in the
interests of the public, not for the purpose of
subjecting the defendant Laucirica to any penalties, nor was he placed in jeopardy before the
court by becoming a party to the action. Therefore the in1paneling of a jury because of the defendant's appearance and voluntarily becoming
.a party to the action, on the ground of his claiming
an interest in the liquors and pleading an acquittal in a fonner proceeding in another tribunal in
which he had been prosecuted crilninally, would
have rendered these proceedings farcical."
See also extensive Annotation in :27 ALR 2d 113i,
1142.
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CONCLUSION
It is respectfully subn1itted that the Judgment of the
District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, as to
the return of certain items of personal property to Club
Feraco should be reversed and that Libelees, Respondents and Cross Appellants Appeal should be dismissed.
Respectfully submitted,
FRANK E. MOSS
County Attorney
Salt Lake County, Utah
PETER F. LEARY
BRUCE S. JENKINS
Deputy County Attorneys
S.alt Lake County, Utah

39
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Received ............ copies of the foregoing brief this..-------.•,
day of. ..............................................., 1957.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

